From the DC-3 to Hypersonic Flight: ICAO in a Changing Environment by Sochor, Eugene
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 55 | Issue 2 Article 4
1989
From the DC-3 to Hypersonic Flight: ICAO in a
Changing Environment
Eugene Sochor
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eugene Sochor, From the DC-3 to Hypersonic Flight: ICAO in a Changing Environment, 55 J. Air L. & Com. 407 (1989)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol55/iss2/4
FROM THE DC-3 TO HYPERSONIC FLIGHT: ICAO
IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
EUGENE SOCHOR*
A S CIVIL AVIATION is poised to enter the twenty-first
century, it will be choking on its own success unless it
can develop innovative approaches to increasingly com-
plex problems that evolve more quickly than the body
politic can absorb. These problems concern technologi-
cal developments, consumer demands, constraints on the
infrastructure, and deregulation policies that have buf-
feted the industry. The challenges are not new and apply
to other industries as well in the global market, but they
affect airlines on an unprecedented scale. The challenges
are forcing both the international airlines and their gov-
ernments to rethink such fundamental issues as their role
in controlling a traditionally well-protected industry. The
effects of these developments on the international system
are still far from clear, but they are felt by all those who
have a part in managing the system: governments; air-
lines; and their international counterparts, the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
International Air Transport Association (IATA).'
* Eugene Sochor was a senior official with ICAO for twelve years and previ-
ously served in UNESCO in Paris and in the U.S. State Department. He has writ-
ten for various scholarly journals and is the author of a book on the politics of
international aviation to be published by Macmillan in 1990.
1 IATA, which currently groups 154 active and 33 associate members, is the
airlines' trade organization. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, 1989
ANNUAL REPORT 14. Its wide range of activities, including interlining and other
cooperative practices, combined with its tariff conferences, have given it a domi-
nant, if not uncontested voice, in all economic matters affecting international avia-
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TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The international carriage of passengers and cargo by
air is a complicated procedure based on complex technol-
ogy that requires the cooperation and goodwill of all na-
tions. Since ICAO came into existence in 1944, the
number of passengers carried on the world's scheduled
airlines has increased more than a hundredfold - from
nine million to over one billion in 1988.2 Looked at in an-
other way, the number of passengers carried on sched-
uled domestic and international routes in a single year
represents more than the combined populations of North
and South America. Air freight that did not exist forty-
five years ago has become an essential component of
world trade.
The basic instrument that governs the way air transport
operates is the Convention on International Civil Aviation
signed at the Chicago Conference in 1944. 3 It contains
tion. It has a close relationship with ICAO and participates in all its meetings as
an observer.
2 Annual Report of the Council - 1988, ICAO Doc. 9530, at 3 (1988) [hereinafter
Annual Report 1988]; see generally J.W.D. BRANCKER, IATA WHAT IT DOES (1977).
3 The Convention produced six important documents, five of which still govern
the way air transport operates today. On that score alone, the Conference could
be called a success. First, the Convention on International Civil Aviation was con-
cluded, to be known as the Chicago Convention, which spells out the rights and
obligations of states in international aviation. Convention on International Civil
Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. It came into force on April 14,
1947 after it was ratified by 26 states. See Y. KIHL, CONFLICT ISSUES AND INTERNA-
TIONAL CIVIL AVIATION DECISIONS: THREE CASES 2 (1971). As of 1989, 162 states
had ratified the Chicago Convention. An Interim Agreement on International
Civil Aviation was completed which established the framework of an international
agency. Thus, the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO)
was born. Chicago Convention, supra, art. 45, 61 Stat. at 1193, T.I.A.S. No. 1591,
15 U.N.T.S. at 326. It functioned remarkably well and became a permanent
agency when the Chicago Convention came into effect. As to the basic issues of
air rights, the first two freedoms were adopted as part of a multilateral agreement
acceptable to all participants. They remain in force today as the International Air
Services Transit Agreement, which has been ratified by 100 countries. Interna-
tional Air Services Transit Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat.
1693, E.A.S. No. 487, 84 U.N.T.S. 389. The first two freedoms of the air recog-
nized by the Convention participants state: "Each Contracting State grants to the
other Contracting States the following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled
international air services: (1) The privilege to fly across its territory without land-
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ninety-six articles which cover virtually all aspects of civil
aviation.4 These articles establish both the privileges and
the restrictions to be observed by ICAO's contracting
states. They also provide for the adoption of interna-
tional standards and recommended practices, known as
SARPS in the ICAO jargon, without which international
air transport would be in a state of chaos.5 In mutually
agreeing to these regulatory functions, the delegates at
Chicago reaffirmed a basic principle that every state has
complete and exclusive jurisdiction over its airspace.6
They also agreed that no scheduled international air ser-
vice may operate over or within the territory of another
contracting state without that state's consent.
7
The Chicago Convention was drafted as an instrument
of dual purpose. In the first place, it is the basic instru-
ing; (2) The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes." Id. at art. 1, § 1. The so-
called "five freedoms" or International Air Transport Agreement was also opened
for signature. International Air Transport Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7,
1944, 59 Stat. 1701, E.A.S. No. 488. The additional freedoms recognized in the
Air Transport Agreement include:
(3) The privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo taken on
in the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses;
(4) The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for
the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; (5)
The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the
territory of any other contracting State and the privilege to put down
passengers, mail and cargo coming from any such territory.
Id. at art. 1, § 1. Eventually, 19 states accepted the granting of full reciprocal
rights but nine, including the United States, subsequently denounced it so that
this agreement never gained acceptance. See generally 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 411-14 (1968) (discussing the development of both the Air
Services Transit Agreement and the Air Transport Agreement and the political
reasoning behind the distinction between the two). Finally a "Standard Form of
Bilateral Agreement for the Exchange of Routes and Services" was adopted as
part of the Final Act. The text proved to be of great help in drafting future bilat-
eral agreements.
4 Chicago Convention, supra note 3.
5 See id., at art. 37.
6 Article 1 of the Chicago Convention stipulates: "The contracting States rec-
ognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory." Id. at art. 1.
7 According to article 6 of the Chicago Convention, "[n]o scheduled interna-
tional air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State,
except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in
accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization." Id. at art. 6.
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ment in international air law as it relates to international
civil aviation. The Convention is also the basic constitu-
tional instrument of ICAO and sets out the basic objec-
tives and structure of the Organization.
From the start, ICAO's major task has been to set the
basic international SARPS as now contained in the eight-
een annexes to the Chicago Convention.8 These regula-
tions have been constantly updated to meet successive
generations of aircraft and advances in technology as they
affect flight operations, airworthiness, rules of the air, the
transport of dangerous goods, personnel licensing, air-
ports, aeronautical communications and environmental
protection. 9 In their foresight, the drafters of the Con-
vention provided that these rules be separated from the
body of the Convention so that they could be adopted by
the Council and come into effect without a cumbersome
ratification process.'0 By contrast, amendments to the
Convention must be adopted by a two-third vote of the
Assembly and must be ratified by no less than two-thirds
" See id. at arts. 37, 54(L), 54(M), 90 (establishing the ICAO's authority to pro-
mulgate SARPS as annexes to the Chicago Convention).
! The adopted annexes address the following specific issues: Annex 1: Person-
nel Licensing Annex 2: Rules of the Air
Annex 3: Meteorology
Annex 4: Aeronautical Charts
Annex 5: Units of Measurement to be used in Air-Ground Communications
Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, International Commercial Air Transport
Annex 7: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks
Annex 8: Airworthiness of Aircraft
Annex 9: Facilitation of International Air Transport
Annex 10: Aeronautical Telecommunications
Annex 11: Air Traffic Services
Annex 12: Search and Rescue
Annex 13: Aircraft Accident Inquiry
Annex 14: Aerodomes
Annex 15: Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 16: Environmental Protection
Annex 17: Security
Annex 18: Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
lo See Chicago Convention, supra note 3, at art. 90. The Council, which consists
of 33 states elected for three year terms, is the continuously operating governing
body of the ICAO. See generally PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION, MEMORANDUM ON ICAO 11-12 (1984).
of all contracting states."
Another key to the growth of civil aviation is the vast
work undertaken under the regional plans which list the
services and facilities in the nine regions of ICAO.12 To
give an idea of this undertaking, more than 60,000 such
services have been listed, these being the nuts and bolts of
the global infrastructure.
ICAO's heyday of regulatory activity was the first dec-
ade of its existence when the organization adopted more
annex material than in the following thirty-five years. The
first and foremost priority was the assignment of responsi-
bility for the provision of services and facilities for inter-
national civil aviation within each portion of the global
airspace. Such formal allocations, encompassing all rec-
ognized international air routes, were not without
problems because of the touchy issues of sovereignty over
the airspace. There were also sensitive and complex is-
sues involving portions of the international airspace over
the high seas. 3
One of ICAO's most ambitious accomplishments was
the establishment of weather stations and rescue teams in
the North Atlantic financed jointly by the airlines that use
these facilities. 4 The Organization was thus not only lay-
ing the ground rules but was also breaking new ground in
international cooperation. The Organization had to also
See Chicago Convention, supra note 3, at art. 94.
,2 See PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZA-
TION, MEMORANDUM ON ICAO 21-24 (1987) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM ON ICAO
1987]. Because of different requirements in various parts of the world, ICAO
convenes meetings periodically in each of its nine regions to plan the facilities and
services that are reviewed by the Air Navigation Commission and adopted by the
Council to be implemented by the states concerned in each region. The regional
plans when taken together constitute an integrated worldwide air navigation sys-
tem. Id.
, See T. BUERGENTHAL, LAw-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION OR-
GANIZATION 80-82 (1969) (discussion of the sovereignty of airspace provisions in
article 12 of the Chicago Convention and Annex 2 adopted by the ICAO Council).
14 See MEMORANDUM ON ICAO 1987, supra note 12, at 40-41. Twenty-two gov-
ernments are parties to these joint agreements which cover air traffic control,
communications, and meteorological services for flights over the North Atlantic.
Id.
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mount a network of radio beacons to guide aircraft. To a
large extent this was done by national authorities under
the supervision of ICAO.' 5 International ventures existed
to facilitate radio transmission as well. ICAO helped es-
tablish a set of long-range radio aids to navigation (LO-
RAN) together with meteorological stations in Iceland,
Greenland and the Faeroe Islands for use along transat-
lantic routes. These services were again financed jointly
by the users. This cooperative scheme has evolved techni-
cally over the years and is still the central element of safe
and efficient travel over the North Atlantic.
In setting its worldwide standards, ICAO has had to
keep pace with the rapidly growing evolution in technol-
ogy represented by the change from the DC-3 aircraft to
supersonic aircraft. It has had to focus not only on the
aircraft, but also on the environment in which they fly.
Technological innovations in air transport have vastly ex-
ceeded developments in other modes of transport, except
perhaps for the emergence of supertankers in shipping
and the development of high speed trains.' 6 Dr. R.R.
Shaw, who directed IATA's technical activities for twenty
years, recalled the extraordinary willingness of the airlines
in the 1960s to pursue "an aggressive programme of far-
sighted activities" dealing not only with immediate day-
to-day concerns but also with long-term needs.' 7
This emphasis on long term objectives developed out of
the challenges of the jet age. The emergence of the
turbo-jet engine, for example, had a two-fold impact. In
the early 1960s, the turbo-jet led to a dramatic increase in
speed while the size of the aircraft remained fairly con-
stant. "'8 In the late 1960s and 197 0s, the speed remained
constant since it was already approaching the sound bar-
15 Id.
- D. REGAS, FLYING OFF COURSE: THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
3 (1985).
17 Shaw, Are We Investing Our Intellect For the Future?, IATA REV., July-Sept. 1987,
at 3.
is D. REGAS, supra note 16.
rier, but the aircraft grew in size.' 9 The advent of the jet
age brought about a change of all ICAO regional plans
and practically all the annexes and related documents
since these were tailored for a far different flight profile of
speed, altitude and passenger seating.
Because adjusting to the technological advancements
brought about by new aircraft is an expensive and elabo-
rate process, the Organization steered a cautious line in
planning ahead. In 1960, the Organization formed a
panel to look into the problems that would likely result
from the advent of supersonic aircraft. The panel soon
was overtaken by much larger problems incident to jumbo
jet service which, as it turned out, arrived on the scene
first.20 At present, in view of the considerable doubts as
to the viability of the hypersonic aircraft, and notwith-
standing the glowing forecasts of its promoters, the Or-
ganization is remaining on the sidelines.
Over the years, ICAO has faced momentous choices in
selecting new communications and navigation systems for
worldwide use. New equipment inevitably creates new
types of problems because it takes years for a new system
to be fully implemented. In the meantime, the new must
co-exist with the old. For example, in 1949 ICAO estab-
lished requirements for the Instrument Landing System
(ILS), which is still in use today as the standard precision
landing aid. 21 Ten years later, after an exhaustive consid-
eration of alternative short-range navigational aids, ICAO
settled upon the VOR/DME as the basic international air
IId.
21) See Freer, New Problems Arise, Old Ones Return - 1976 to 1986, ICAO BULL.,
Jan. 1987, at 32. States and airport operators were fearful that many of their
newly laid runways and ramps would become obsolete for jumbo jets. They also
remembered that facilities built in the 1950s for prop-driven aircraft became inad-
equate when the first jets entered service. Id. at 34.
21 Id.; see also Microwave Landing System Advisory Circular Issue No. 1, ICAO Circular
165-AN/104 (1981) [hereinafter MLS Advisory Circular]. "The world-wide imple-
mentation of present-day ILS is recognized, within its technical and operational
capabilities, as a valuable contribution to the safety and regularity of all weather
operations." Id. at 1.
1989] ICAO0 413
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navigation system aid.22 By the early 1970s, the aviation
community had concluded that an improved landing aid
was needed to meet the growing requirements of a jet
era.23 In order to assure the safety and efficiency of air
transport the ILS would have to be replaced on a global
basis.2 4 Thus, after a long and protracted decision mak-
ing process in which various states championed their own
equipment, the ICAO chose a new system, the Microwave
Landing System (MLS). 2 5
The Organization has been faulted for being too slow in
responding to technical developments and for being over-
taken by events. To the extent this criticism true, it is due
to the nature of the complex technology and to the fact
that the Organization is ill-equipped to make decisions
that involve the high stakes of avionics. The Organization
does not have a think tank, nor does it have the expertise
to deal with every issue. The Air Navigation Commission
(ANC), ICAO's technical arm, relies on the advice of spe-
cialized panels. These panels, depending on the issue, are
themselves heavily dependent on the recommendations of
the airlines and the aeronautical industry.
After a specialized panel submits its report, a long de-
velopment stage begins with an analysis of the proposals
by the ICAO Secretariat. The Secretariat then submits its
findings, together with its own recommendations, to the
22 Freer, supra note 20, at 34.
2-. MLS Advisory Circular, supra note 21, at 2. In 1971 the All Weather Opera-
tions Panel (AWOP) concluded that a new approach and landing guidance system
was necessary to overcome the limitations of the ILS. AWOP proposed the adop-
tion of the new system by the mid 1970s.
24 See id. at 3.
- Freer, supra note 20, at 34. The MLS system ultimately chosen was a "time
reference scanning beam system" jointly developed by Australia and the United
States. Id. The main handicap of the Instrument Landing System (ILS) is that its
single narrow approach forces aircraft to line up single file and land in turn. The
Microwave Landing System (MLS) provides a wider approach and operates on
much higher frequencies than the ILS, which allows pilots to come in from several
directions and at different speeds. The MLS allows for a more efficient use of
runways by different types of aircraft in all kinds of terrain and weather. See MLS
Advisory Circular, supra note 21, at 12-13; see also Underwood &Janes, Progress Con-
tinues to Be Made in MLS Technology, ICAO BULL., Mar. 1989, at 20.
ANC. The ANC decides on the best means of tackling the
problem, and on whether there is a need for the Council
to adopt new or amended SARPS. A proposed change in
the annexes can be a laborious process, involving consul-
tation with member states and possible consideration at
either a worldwide conference or one of the divisional
meetings that ICAO convenes to discuss specific technical
problems. Much to ICAO's credit, there has never been a
case where a final action by the Council has been rejected
by either a member state or by the aviation community.
One might argue that the role of ICAO is to advance
technology, but in practical terms, this cannot be done
without the support of the international aviation commu-
nity, and more particularly, the support of the airlines.
Unlike earlier years, the carriers have been remarkably
cautious in supporting technical innovations for fear that
they would have to bear the brunt of the cost. The pro-
motion of advanced concepts and theories that may have
useful applications to civil aviation is now left to the air-
craft avionics industry. All segments of the industry, how-
ever, including the airlines, are part of a Special
Committee on Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) cre-
ated by ICAO to implement new concepts, including sat-
ellite technology, which would provide benefits for civil
aviation. 6
Considering that we are already in the space age, it
seems incongruous that satellite technology is not fully
used to relieve airspace congestion. As early as 1968,
ICAO realized the potential of satellites for air navigation
when it set up an international mechanism (AEROSAT) to
plan a satellite for the exclusive use of civil aviation.27 A
26 See MEMORANDUM ON ICAO 1987, supra note 12, at 21. The FANS Committee
was established by the ICAO Council in 1983 to make recommendations for the
development of future air navigation systems over a 25-year period. Id.; see also
Smit, Report on the Activities of the ICAO Special Committee on Future Navigation Systems,
THE CONTROLLER, Mar. 1988, at 10, 10-12 U.S. Smit was chairman of the FANS
Committee).
27 Whenever they are used, satellites have eliminated communication deficien-
cies caused chiefly by unreliable high frequency radio links. Satellite links are also
1989] ICAO0 415
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consortium of states, which included the United States,
Canada, and the nine members of the European Space
Research Organization, scheduled the launch of an exper-
imental satellite in 1979-1980. The whole program was
shelved, however, largely because of the industry's con-
cern over the long-term financial implications of such a
system.28
When the aviation industry belatedly woke up to the
missed opportunities, the best satellite navigation avail-
able was to share services for mobile communications
with the maritime users and to make sure that the next
generation of satellites launched by the International
Maritime Satellite Agency (INMARSAT) included specifi-
cations for aviation users provided by ICAO.2 9 Beyond
the immediate communications needs, the aviation com-
munity looks forward to a highly accurate, multipurpose
satellite system for its future communication, navigation
and surveillance needs.
The creation of an aviation satellite system is undoubt-
edly on the horizon. The central question is what ICAO's
role will be in managing this global enterprise. Fortu-
nately, ICAO was spared a political clash over choosing a
system from among those under development when the
being used successfully in some cases to provide voice communications between
area control centers to assist in the normal transfer of responsibility for air traffic.
See generally Eydaleine, Navigation by Satellite - The Next Step for CivilAviation, ICAO
BULL., Mar. 1988, at 16, 16-18 (discussing other advantages to a satellite naviga-
tion system and the current state of satellite navigation equipment).
28 The international airlines were particularly concerned about costs at the time
because they were in the midst of a deep financial crisis brought about by dramatic
increases in fuel prices combined with stagnating demand and falling yields. D.
REGAS, supra note 16, at 18-19. One commentator recently estimated that the cap-
ital required for satellite systems would be in the order of $5 to $6 billion and that
nearly half of this amount would have to be borne by aircraft operators. Shaw,
Satellite Technology and Civil Aviation, IATA REV., Apr.-June 1984, at 8.
' INMARSAT was created in 1976 as an intergovernmental, commercially ori-
ented organization to provide maritime satellite communications. Convention on
the International Maritime Satellite Organization, opened for signature Sept. 3, 1976,
31 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 9605, 15 I.L.M. 1051. It amended its charter in 1985 to
provide satellite services to aeronautical as well as maritime users. Amendments to
the Convention of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), ICAO
Doc. C-WP/8126 (Nov. 8, 1985).
United States and the USSR announced in April 1989 that
they would offer their systems forjoint use by the aviation
community.3 0 Significantly, the surprise announcement
came at the last meeting of the FANS Committee, thereby
ensuring a prime role for ICAO in planning the political,
financial and institutional aspects of the new system. 1
The ICAO Council lost no time in deciding to form a new
committee to carry on the tasks of the FANS group and
develop the technical requirements for the use and man-
agement of the global system expected to be in operation
by the mid-1990s. The effectiveness of the system will ul-
timately depend on these detailed specifications.
CROWDED AIRSPACE AND REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS
The most pressing challenge facing the air transport in-
dustry is the congested airspace and airport gridlock that
affects the busiest air routes. The major problem areas
are in North America, Europe and the Asia/Pacific region.
One FAA study shows that eighteen major airports in the
United States each experience more than 20,000 hours of
delay annually.3 2 Airport construction is nearly at a stand-
still. The last major airport built in the United States was
Dallas/Fort Worth International, which opened in 1974.
Moreover, construction on the new airport for Denver
was delayed by bitter wrangling over noise and cost.
The picture is just as grim in Europe. What once was
known as "summer peak" congestion in Europe is now
prevalent from early spring to late autumn, resulting in
heavy and costly delays for the airlines and passengers.
The only major airport under construction is in Munich,
30 See Anodina & Turner, US/USSR Cooperation in the Areas of GPS-GLONASS to
Develop Joint Operational Performance Standards for Compatible Civil Aviation User Equip-
ment, ICAO Doc. FANS (Paris) WG/Z WP19, at 1, 3-5 (Apr. 7, 1989). This work-
ing paper outlines the agreement on performance standards reached by the two
nations. Id.
31 Id. at 1-3. A working group of the FANS Committee will coordinate the co-
operative work of the US/USSR technical specialists on an arranged schedule. Id.
at 5.
-12 Malcolm, Aviation Experts Warn of Gridlock at U.S. Airports, N.Y. Times,June 19,
1988, § 1, at 22, col. 5.
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and it is already expected to be operating over capacity
when it opens in 1991. The problem is all the more acute
in a continent where large areas of the airspace are re-
served for military use and where frequent labor
problems with air traffic controllers .cause havoc with
flight operations."
The largest area of growth has been the Asia/Pacific
Region with annual increases in passenger traffic averag-
ing about nine percent annually, well above the world's
average. ICAO expects this growth to continue to the
point that the region will account for thirty-nine percent
of the world's airline passenger traffic by the year 2000,
compared to twenty percent in 1978. 34 Looking at the re-
gion as a whole, the problem is not so much lack of facili-
ties as the need for a more efficient route structure to
accommodate the longer range aircraft - mostly the Boe-
ing 747s - which have revolutionized trans-Pacific air
travel in recent years.
Worldwide, if one assumes a continuing average annual
traffic growth of some five to six percent, the number of
scheduled passenger journeys may double to two billion
by the year 2000. The number of aircraft is expected to
double to more than 11,000 with a resulting increase in
the volume of aircraft movements. 35 These dire predic-
tions are a matter of concern to the aviation community,
given the fact that the supporting infrastructure cannot
keep pace with the demand. The continued development
of civil aviation will face its most acute test on the ground,
where national interests are tied to a host of difficult pol-
icy and environmental issues at the federal, state or pro-
vincial, and local level.
With respect to airport and traffic control, decision-
making at the national level is often thwarted or slowed by
.3 See generally Oudin, Air Traffic Congestion in Europe - ICAO 's Initiatives for Reme-
dial Actions, ICAO BULL., Jan. 1989, at 15, 15-18.
34 The Economic Situation of Air Transport-1978 to the Year 2000, ICAO Circular
200-AT/90, at 42 (1989).
-1 Eser, The State of the Industry, IATA REV. Oct.-Dec. 1988, at 3, 5.
local and state officials who must contend with their own
constituents. Even the FAA does not have the political
clout to get its own way when it comes to deciding on the
use of its airport construction grants. Throughout Eu-
rope and in Japan, environmental groups have mounted
fierce, sometimes fatal, opposition to increasing existing
airport facilities. In November 1987, two policemen were
shot during a protest outside Frankfurt airport, the first
police officers to be gunned down in postwar Germany.
Tokyo's international airport at Narita has long been a
battleground between police and local residents.
With runways, terminals and air traffic control stretched
to capacity on both sides of the Atlantic, hardly a week
goes by without a statement by an airline executive, an
editorial, or a report warning of an impending crisis if co-
ordinated action is not forthcoming. A recent report of
the London-based Aviation Industry Strategy group
minces no words when it concludes: "Governments must
bite the bullet of expansion of runways, air traffic control
and infrastructure if their current aviation industries are
to survive . ".. 36
The solutions to the air traffic gridlock require urgent
action, both in the sky and on the ground. One of IATA's
priority tasks is to convince states that they must provide
additional airspace for civil traffic in order to allow a more
direct and efficient route structure. In preparation for
the introduction of the new, very long haul Boeing 747-
400, certain routes have already been redrawn for the
most advantageous use of the aircraft in the Far East and
the Pacific.3 7 At long last, the Soviet Union may be ready
to open to more airlines its trans-Siberian route between
Europe and the Far East, which hitherto has been re-
served for Eastern bloc countries and a few privileged
1 Cotter, Traffic May Cripple European Decontrol, J. CoM., June 21, 1988 (newspa-
per citing the Aviation Industry Strategy group).
.17 Annual Report 1988, supra note 2, at 48. Various meetings to map new routes
have been held at the Bangkok regional office of ICAO. The most direct route for
the B-747-400 would be across the Soviet Union and Mongolia.
1989] ICAO 419
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Western carriers. 8
Technical solutions can provide short term relief by in-
creasing the flow of traffic and the capacity of airports.
With regard to congested airways, studies are under way
in several countries to develop specifications for im-
proved equipment to reduce the required minimal separa-
tion in terms of horizontal and vertical distances.
Horizontal separation between adjacent aircraft has been
redefined on a number of occasions as a result of im-
proved radar surveillance and foolproof navigation sys-
tems. 3 9 Improving the height-keeping accuracy that is
needed to reduce vertical spacing is a more complex mat-
ter. It is technically feasible, however, to reduce by half
the 2,000 foot vertical separation in the upper airspace
and thereby increase capacity without more than a modest
investment in air-data systems by few users.40
New separation rules will provide a significant improve-
ment in the flow of traffic but will not address the problem
of congestion in terminal areas. Possible solutions to ter-
minal congestion include: an increase in the number of
runway exits and a reduction in both the three mile sepa-
ration between landing aircraft and the space between
parallel runways. The gradual introduction of the MLS
promises further improvements in the use of existing air-
port facilities. Noise curfews at airports may also be eased
as older aircraft are being replaced by new and quieter
jets. Finally, the longer term prospect of a global naviga-
tion system, which could further reduce the minimum
separation distances between aircraft and provide preci-
sion approaches to runways, may greatly expand the
number and safety of flight operations.
.1 Airlines would be charged hefty fees for the use of Soviet airspace since the
USSR is not a signatory to the International Air Transit Agreement.
.' Annual Report 1988, supra note 2, at 46-47. Navigation systems are now so
reliable that this may lead to overconfidence on the part of pilots and human error
due to incorrect waypoint insertion.
40 Changes in the separation minima are being considered by a special ICAO
panel based on studies and evaluations being carried out in Canada, Western Eu-
rope, Japan, the United States, and the USSR. Id. at 46.
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The safety risks inherent in drafting new specifications
need to be assessed constantly to guarantee recognition
of all affected areas. The International Federation of Air-
line Pilots Associations (IFALPA) has steadfastly opposed
reducing separation rules before they are demonstrated
to be safe. 41 Another regulatory development to enhance
safety and reduce the number of near misses that is caus-
ing concern in the aviation community stems from the
United States decision to require that all aircraft of more
than thirty seats flying in United States airspace be
equipped with an anticollision device known as Traffic
Alert and Collision Avoidance system (TCAS-II). 42 The
rule, which mandates TCAS-II installation no later than
December 30, 1991, is equally applicable to foreign carri-
ers.43 This rule has resulted in protests that the United
States is acting unilaterally by imposing its own require-
ments ahead of ICAO standards which have yet to be de-
cided.4 There have been negative reactions as to the
usefulness and effectiveness of such an airborne collision
avoidance system.45
41 Pilots have been at odds with the airlines over this issue since 1966 when
IFALPA successfully delayed the introduction of reduced separation standards
over the North Atlantic until proven operationally safe. It has insisted on thor-
ough statistical research every time the question has come up. See IFALPA, His-
TORY OF IFALPA (1948-1980) 76-77 (1981).
42 See 49 U.S.C. § 1421(f) (Supp. V 1987).
-1 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.356, 129.224
(1989). A bill allowing extension of the deadline for TCAS-II installation was
passed by the House of Representatives on July 13, 1989. H.R. 2151, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H4536-38 (daily ed.July 31, 1989); see also Dead-
line for TCAS Installation May be Extended to 1992 or 1993, Avi. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
May 22, 1989 at 109 (discussing H.R. 2151 as a response to criticisms of the origi-
nal statute).
44 Carey, Europeans Perturbed by U.S. Pressure to Install Aircraft-Collision Protection,
Wall St. J., June 28, 1989, at A 11, col. 1.
The FAA concedes that the U.S. rule has ruffled some feathers.
"Some countries have raised arguments that the U.S. is jumping
ahead by unilaterally imposing this regulation on foreign carriers,"
says Joseph Del Balzo, the FAA's executive director of system devel-
opment. But he says that argument pales before the system's safety
advantages.
Id.
. Id. Carey explains as follows:
Others question if too many TCAS commands to pilots could create
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The problems that arise from overburdened airspace
are not easily solved, and the existing solutions extend be-
yond regulatory developments. ICAO can look at global
needs, but the detailed requirements are set forth in the
regional air navigation plans and implemented by the
countries concerned with due regard to their own priori-
ties. An acute need exists for additional resources practi-
cally everywhere, in developed as well as developing
countries. The United States, for example, is under pres-
sure to improve airport facilities.46
ICAO's greatest difficulty over the years has probably
been translating its paper norms into practical realities.
Setting standards and procedures for air navigation serv-
ices does not mean they will be applied in practice. The
same holds true for the regional air navigation plans.
ICAO's regional offices, which are constantly following up
on the implementation of regional plans, hear constant la-
ments over lack of money, trained technicians and equip-
ment. Unlike IATA and the airlines, which have been
known to put pressure on governments to correct defi-
ciencies, ICAO stays clear of national policies. ICAO,
however, may intervene in an extraordinary situation,
such as when Nigeria lacked navigational aids. The air-
lines threatened to suspend operations and the Council
President discussed the matter with officials and arranged
havoc. If one pilot gets a warning and diverts his route, that could
cause a chain reaction of other pilots trying to avoid the first plane's
maneuver, they say. "This is a very dangerous position for both the
pilot and the controller," says Bart Bakker, president of the Interna-
tional Federation of Airline Pilots' [sic] Associations.
Id.; see also Witkin, Airlines Ordered to Install Devices to Avert Collisions, N.Y. Times,Jan.
6, 1989, at Al, col. 2 (aircraft with TCAS will not be protected from those without
transponders); Witkin, Testing Urged for Airliner Safety Device, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24,
1989, at A12, col. I (report to Congress noted foreign countries' complaints
about the rule).
4,5 The Government has resisted efforts by the airline industry to use the $5.6
billion surplus in the Airport and Airways Trust Fund for airport expansion. The
fund, which is financed largely by the eight percent tax on tickets, has been al-
lowed to accumulate "because it makes the federal deficit look better." FAA Seeks
More Airports to Lessen Congestion, But its Chances Amount to a Wing and a Prayer, Wall
St.J., Aug. 26, 1987, at 42, col. 1.
for a technical assistance mission.4 7
As planners have been overtaken by their own predic-
tions, governments are coming under increasing pressure
t6 adopt a system approach to resolve congestion
problems, especially those involving air traffic control. As
one trade publication noted, "the whole subject is a polit-
ical mine field [since] nobody wants airports next door
and spending on ATC [air traffic control] is often a lower
priority than housing or health services. It's also a longer
term problem than most politicians are interested in." 48
The first test of the political will of states to provide
long-range solutions will come in Europe. The twin pres-
sures of liberalization policies and overcrowded facilities
have already led to a public outcry that has compelled
governments to begin talking about supra-national solu-
tions to deal with continent-wide problems. The first step
was a decision by the twenty-two member European Civil
Aviation Conference to work together on a plan to estab-
lish two central and interlinked flow control centers in Eu-
rope by 1994; one in Brussels to handle all the traffic in
Western Europe and the other in Moscow to coordinate
flights in Eastern Europe. 49 Flow control, however, is not
a means in itself. Although it can help relieve congestion,
flow control planning cannot eliminate the shortcomings
in the system and increase its capacity to absorb the traffic
growth.
The global nature of aviation, which transcends sover-
eign borders, poses problems in management that go be-
47 Report of the President of the Council, ICAO Doc.WP/7960 (Feb. 18, 1985); Inter-
avia Airletter No. 11,274 (June 25, 1987) (reports that pilots have had to cope
with unchecked beacons and malfunctioning approach radars at Nigerian airports
and that this probably accounts for the fact that there are on average two near
misses per day).
41 The Airport Straitjacket, AIRLINE Bus., Apr. 1988, at 25.
411 Sutton, Eurocontrol Back in Favour, INTERAVIA, Feb. 1989. The overall coor-
dination will be managed by EUROCONTROL, the agency originally set up in
1963 to oversee air traffic control in Western Europe. The agency will not be able
to control European airspace as a single entity, however, since each country re-
tains national sovereignty over its airspace. Id; see also, Mack, The U.K. Air Traffic
System - Planning for Growth, ICAO BULL., Sept. 1988, at 21.
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yond existing mechanisms and requires global solutions.
Several articles of the Chicago Convention give states
considerable scope for organizing air transport on a re-
gional basis. 50 In a modest way, ICAO is prompting Euro-
pean states to think about such multinational facilities and
services. Guidance material developed by ICAO shows
that certain services now carried out by individual states
can be provided more effectively and at a lower cost by a
single entity operated by one or several states. To achieve
this result, technical planning groups will need to apply a
different approach and focus on broader financial and
managerial questions, rather than on the strict implemen-
tation in each state of the regional plans.
With respect to the provision of air navigation facilities
and services, which is the responsibility of each state, as
spelled out in article 28 of the Chicago Convention, there
is nothing to prevent states from delegating these func-
tions to a specific public or private entity.5 This is al-
ready the case in Africa and Central America where
individual countries are ill-equipped to perform these
tasks on their own. Within ICAO's own institutional
framework, the joint financing agreements for air naviga-
tion services over the North Atlantic have given the Or-
ganization considerable experience in managing services
on an international scale.52
THE SHAPE OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGY
The past thirty-five years have brought significant
changes in the international airline industry from the in-
troduction of the jet age by the ill-fated de Havilland
Comet,53 to the successive series of turbojets, wide-bodies
.1 See Chicago Convention, supra note 3, at arts. 77, 78, 79,
- Id. at art. 28.
62 See C. RHYNE, A MuTuc & R. SANDS, LAW MAKING ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 16-17 (1978); supra note 14 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the joint financing of air navigation services in the North
Atlantic).
,. See R. DAVIES, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S AIRLINES 453 (1967). The com-
mercial jet era started in May 1952 when the British-designed Comet I was intro-
and a short-lived promise for greater use of supersonic
transport. During this period, technical advances in air-
craft and engine designs have revolutionized commercial
air transport, made possible lower fares, and generated
multimillion dollar expansions of ground facilities. As
significant as these developments have been, they will
pale in comparison with the change travellers can expect
in the future. In an address to the Technical Conference
of IATA, Assad Kotaite, the President of the ICAO Coun-
cil, commented on the rapid changes in air transport:
[A] technical revolution is sweeping through the world air
transport industry. It has already been experienced by
passengers, to a limited extent, in such new airliners as the
Boeing 757 and 767 twin-engine aircraft.; The extent of
the technological revolution brought about by these larger
aircraft encompasses virtually every aspect of the industry
and will be accompanied by some equally far-reaching in-
novations on the ground - the microwave landing system
(MLS) that will speed the flow of aircraft in and out of in-
creasingly congested airports and automated air traffic
control that will facilitate the controllers' work.54
Futuristic aircraft such as hypersonic transports or
leviathans carrying a thousand passengers are on the
drawing board or in the early stages of feasibility study.
By the early twenty-first century, some of these aircraft
will be operational, while others may not see service
before the year 2025, if at all.55
For the foreseeable future, however, aircraft builders
are concentrating on extracting the maximum benefits
from existing technology and the wide-body fuselage pio-
neered by the Boeing 747. The reasons for this are
largely economic. The cost of new aircraft continues to
escalate. Aircraft manufacturers anticipate that commer-
duced on the London-Johannesburg route. Id. at 453. In 1954, disaster struck
when two Comets went down. The aircraft was withdrawn from service. Subse-
quent investigation revealed the accidents had been caused by metal fatigue. Id.
at 453-54.
-14 Address to the 21st Technical Conference of IATA, in Montreal (Sept. 1987).
--5 LaFond, The Shape of Things to Come, ICAO Public Information Office.
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cial airlines will need to spend $500,000 million (in 1988
dollars) for new aircraft until the year 2005.56 This cost is
comparable to expenditures on equipment for the thirty-
five year period between 1950 and 1985.
The days are gone when technological advances were
engineered by ambitious airline executives like Juan
Trippe, who encouraged Boeing to produce the 707, a
plane that inaugurated transatlantic jet travel in 1958. 57
Gone also are the days when a strong aeronautical indus-
try, subsidized by governments, could spur technological
progress and force new designs on the airlines even when
this was not always in their best interest. A striking exam-
ple, of course, was the development of the Anglo-French
Concorde, a technological triumph for the governments,
but a commercial fiasco for British Airways and -Air
France.58 The aircraft of the future will be decided not by
national prestige but by economic realities. Nothing illus-
trates better the new environment in the aeronautical in-
dustry than the decision by Air France in 1987 to "buy
American" and order sixteen Boeing 747-400s in a $3.5
billion package that was until then the second largest ever
for the American firm.
In this context, the announcement by President Reagan
in his State of the Union address in 1986 that the United
States would develop a hypersonic aircraft caused few rip-
.1 Fleet Renewal and Investment in Airport Infrastructure, ICAO Doc. A27-WP/48, at
2 (July 7, 1989).
.7 See R. DALEY, AN AMERICAN SAGA: JUAN TRIPPE AND His PAN AM EMPIRE 413
(1980). Trippe's biggest contribution to commercial aviation was the support he
gave to the development of the 747 jumbo jet in the mid 1960s when Pan Ameri-
can was still the most influential airline in the world. Flushed with the success of
his 707, Bill Allen, then president of Boeing, was thinking of a larger version.
Trippe persuaded Allen to build the 747 by agreeing that Pan American would
buy and operate twenty-five of the aircraft. Id. at 432.
" See S. WHEATCROFT, AIR TRANSPORT POLICY 50 (1984). In his pioneering
study of the aircraft industry Stephen Wheatcroft has shown the strong linkage
between government-subsidized manufacturers and government-owned airlines.
He quotes a British Airline executive to the effect that less frequent replacements
of transport aircraft by new and more advanced designs is likely to help rather
than hinder the healthy economic progress of the airlines. Id.
pies in the international aviation community. 59 The air-
lines had more immediate concerns about making the
right choices in renewing their fleet, while the major
American manufacturers wanted to make sure the orders
went their way in the face of heavy competition from the
Airbus consortium. While the Airbus' share of the world
market had been about seventeen percent between 1980
and 1985, it jumped to forty-four percent during the first
quarter of 1987.60 More galling was the European pene-
tration of the American market through the sale of
twenty-three Airbus A-300s to Eastern Airlines on terms
that were without precedent.6 '
Even as Boeing and McDonnell Douglas answered the
Airbus challenge, they complained that the fight was un-
fair because of government subsidies their competitor
reaped from the start. Airbus executives pointed out, in
response, that the United States aerospace firms had ben-
efited from billions of dollars in government defense con-
tracts that could be considered an indirect form of subsidy
since these funds enabled the aircraft companies to cover
overhead in their own research and development.62 The
United States eventually took up the matter at govern-
ment level negotiations under the auspices of the General
-59 President's State of the Union Address, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 138
(Feb. 4, 1986). President Reagan stated:
[T]his nation remains fully committed to America's space program.
... [W]e are going forward with research on a new Orient Express
that could, by the end of the next decade, take off from Dulles Air-
port, accelerate up to 25 times the speed of sound, attaining low
Earth orbit or flying to Tokyo within two hours.
Id.
o Milner & Yoffie, Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a
Theory of Corporate Trade Demands, 43(2) INT'L ORG. 239, 257 (1989) (citing statistics
from the United States Department of Commerce and the Dow Jones News
Service).
- See The National Interest, 122 FLIGHT INT'L 341 (1982). Frank Borman, the
chairman of Eastern, was quoted as telling his employees: "If you do not kiss the
French flag every time you see it, at least salute it. The export financing on our
Airbus deal subsidized this airline by more than $100 million." Id.
62 Greenhouse, Airbus's Threat to U.S. Rivals, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1987, at DI,
col. 3; see generally Europe Forging New Alliances for Civil Transport Production, Avi. WK.
& SPACE TECH., July 27, 1987, at 26; Fink, Airbus Industries Competitive Gambit, Avi.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 3, 1987, at 15.
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but apparently
without much success.63 The issue simmered down when
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas faced such a backlog of
orders for new aircraft that they could safely relax their
pressure on the United States government for trade ac-
tion against Airbus.
Beyond this trade war stands the need to finance the
skyrocketing cost of aeronautical technology. Airbus is a
prime example of how a multinational cooperative ap-
proach can create the resource pool necessary to finance
the research, development and production of new aircraft.
The governments of the Airbus consortium (British Aero-
space, France's Aerospatiale, Germany's Messerschmitt
and Spain's CASA) have underwritten the effort with large
infusions of cash, but the A330/340 model is probably the
last such project to receive this level of support. The con-
sortium must now seek new cooperative arrangements
and risk sharing partnerships in its aggressive strategy to
cope with free market forces throughout the global air
transport business.64
Looming on the horizon are competitive challenges for
the financing of the hypersonic aircraft, as studies by its
American sponsors (NASA, Boeing and McDonnell Doug-
las) show that demand for high speed civil transport ex-
ists. One study found that the success of such a project
will require an international consortium to deal with com-
plex issues of costs, airports and the environment.6 5 The
report concluded that it is "economically and technologi-
cally impossible for any single country or company to de-
velop [a hypersonic aircraft]. It is mandatory that an
international consortium be organized as early as possi-
63 See Greenhouse, supra note 62. The newspaper reports: "A high level trade
delegation from Washington requested that Airbus open its books in order for the
delegation to determine whether the government funding Airbus received was a
loan to be repaid or a grant. A grant is not permitted under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." Id.
- See Fink, supra note 62.
- Market Studies Indicate Demand for High-Speed Civil Transport, Avi. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 21, 1988, at 54.
ble, backed by appropriate financial and philosophical
commitments from governments in the U.S., Japan and
Europe.
6 6
With the Americans in the lead, the Europeans do not
want to be left behind. The Euromart consortium, led by
Aerospatiale and supported by the European Economic
Community, initiated a two-year project to study the pos-
sibility of a Concorde 2 and a hypersonic Concorde 3.67
Aerospatiale hopes to be able to put the Concorde 2 in
service by 2005, when the life expectancy of the current
Concorde expires. The hypersonic model may not be
ready before 2015.6s Yet, many in the airline industry are
not quite ready to bet on such prospects.
For its part, ICAO's assessment is one of cautious ex-
pectation. ICAO notes: "Any new SST aircraft will need
to have economically acceptable operating costs ... [and]
meet exacting environmental requirements in the noise,
sonic boom and emission areas." 69 In addition, while
ICAO recognizes the significant advantages of cruise
speeds between Mach 2 and Mach 3, "without the need
for new construction materials, new fuels or variable cycle
engines . . . [such aircraft] would involve expensive and
risky advances in technology. "70
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Airlines have been caught up in the process of change
from the beginning, but the change was easily identifiable
.. Id. "A highly run consortium [is] favored for multiple reasons: high costs,
the involvement of many countries and airports, huge Pacific traffic growth, tech-
nology and research needs and the need for international agreement on environ-
mental issues." Id.
61 Wise, Europe Looks Beyond the Concorde, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1988, at D8, col.
4.
, Id. The supersonic version, the Concorde 2, will fly faster than the speed of
sound and will be able to fly from New York to Tokyo in five and a half hours.
Comparatively, the hypersonic version under development will fly five times the
speed of sound and will be able to fly from New York to Tokyo in about three
hours. Id.
-' Annual Report 1988, supra note 2, at 38.
70 Id.
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as being driven by rapidly emerging technology. The
changes brought about by radical developments in the
economic environment were an entirely different matter.
These economic developments challenged the basic
framework of the regulatory system that emerged from
the Chicago Convention. These developments are a mat-
ter of concern to ICAO to the extent that they impinge on
the principle of "equal opportunity" written into the pre-
amble of the Convention. 71 Basically, the system has sur-
vived for as long as it has without open frictions because
governments were not inclined to rock the boat. The bi-
lateral agreements provided sufficient flexibility, and car-
tel rates set at the IATA tariff conferences were hardly
ever challenged by the governments.72 This cozy situation
came to an abrupt halt during the fuel crisis of the 1970s
when costs began to escalate rapidly as the result of world
inflation.73 The airlines will not soon forget the economic
difficulties of the mid-seventies. Knut Hammarskjold,
former IATA Director General, recalled it as a time "of
brutal financial realism when the airlines of the world
were being squeezed dry by soaring costs, sky-high inter-
est rates, diminishing yields and nose diving profits. 74
The changes in the economic environment are demon-
strated by a review of worldwide traffic patterns. The pro-
portion of the total scheduled traffic carried by the United
Kingdom and the United States declined over a thirty-
year period (1946-1976) from about two-thirds to a little
more than a quarter. Over the same period, the number
71 Chicago Convention, supra note 3, at preamble.
72 IATA's tariff conferences have long been a source of controversy, particu-
larly in the United States. As the result of deregulation policies, IATA made par-
ticipation in tariff conferences optional. IATA has also dropped its controversial
tariff enforcement program. See Feldman, IA TA Moves from Controversy Toward
Trade Association Model, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Dec. 1987; Plotting IATA 's Future
Course, IATA REV. Oct.-Dec. 1987, at 9, 9-10; Report by the Council on Tariff Enforce-
ment, ICAO Doc. A27-WP/4 EC/I (Feb. 15, 1989).
7, Between 1979 and 1983 the financial losses of IATA members amounted to
over $6 billion. ICAO Doc. A-26 WP/73.
74 Address by Knut Hammarskjold (former IATA Director General), Lloyds of
London Press International Civil Aviation Conference, in New York (Apr. 1980).
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of international scheduled carriers increased from 40 to
180, and the average payload multiplied sevenfold.75
The ensuing competitive battle exacted an even greater
toll due to the rapid growth of the low cost charter flights,
which eventually threw the IATA price-fixing machinery
out of gear. Until then, the charter (nonscheduled) air-
lines and tour operators had remained largely outside the
regulatory framework. They simply did not exist at the
time of the Chicago Conference. Some twenty years later,
the first Atlantic "Skytrain" services of Sir Freddie Laker
brought hordes of bag-packing travellers into the market
and helped transform air transport from a luxury to a
mass-market product. 76 Inevitably, this phenomenon re-
sulted in unprecedented overcapacity on key routes, espe-
cially over the North Atlantic. This situation was
aggravated when the major airlines tried to counter their
higher operations costs by speeding the introduction of
larger jets. In 1975 alone, the unused capacity on the
North Atlantic was equivalent to 15,000 empty Boeing
747 round trips.77
In the face of trends that were evident as far back as
1970, one would have expected that major airlines operat-
ing flights with so many empty seats would have curtailed
their services. No major airline, however, was prepared to
abandon its share of the market to the competition. Thus,
as Andreas Lowenfeld has remarked, "even before [the
fuel crisis of] 1973, the basic Bermuda structure 78 was
under severe stress, and international aviation was a sick
7. Special Air Transport Conference, Information Paper No.3, (1977).
76 See H. BANKS, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREDDIE LAKER 73-79 (1982).
77 K. Hammarskjold, Address to Freight Seminar, in Gothenburg (Mar. 1977).
78 The "Bermuda structure" so laid out in the Bermuda Agreement of 1946,
refers to the balance of economic benefits. This balancing has meant that compe-
tition is limited with respect to market entry (traffic rights and designation), sup-
ply (provisional of capacity), and pricing (tariffs). See generally A. LOWENFELD,
AVIATION LAw, ch. 2, § § 1.13-1.43 (1981) (thorough analysis of the background of
the Bermuda Agreement and its significance to international airline access, capac-
ity, and fares); D. REGAS, supra note 16, at 28-29 (discussing how the Bermuda
type bilateral agreement differed from the more protectionist approaches of ear-
lier bilateral agreements).
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industry. ' 79 It was, however, the first fuel crisis which
brought about an abrupt change of course for everybody
and triggered what was to become an American drive for
far-reaching changes in the regulatory system. By 1975,
as the grumbling of the American carriers became louder,
the administration of President Carter began a compre-
hensive overhaul of its aviation policies. What looked
straightforward on the domestic front was viewed with ap-
prehension in other countries where the airlines were
owned by their respective governments and were inter-
locked with national policy. As Christen Jonsson put it,
"the new policy amounted to a fervent call for interna-
tional deregulation, emphasizing competition, liberaliza-
tion of charter operations, no capacity restraints and
'marketplace' pricing with minimal government
involvement.' '80
At first, American deregulators had planned to revamp
the international system within the existing framework
and in fact took pains to reaffirm their belief in multilater-
alism and the IATA machinery for setting fares and
rates.8 ' The change in policy was triggered by the British
decision to terminate the 1946 Bermuda Agreement and
the year-long negotiations in 1977 leading to a new agree-
ment, known as "Bermuda 2".82
As the cleavage deepened between the United States
and most other countries that resisted free-trade policies
in aviation, ICAO summoned a Special Air Transport
Conference in April 1977 - the most important such gath-
ering since the Chicago Conference.83 Given the fact that
7!1 Lowenfeld, A New Take-Off for International Air Transport, FOREIGN AFF., Oct.
1975, at 44.
8" C. JONSSON, INTERNATIONAL AVIATION AND THE POLITICS OF REGIME CHANGE
36 (1987).
- Brindley, U.S. Air Transport Policy: International Reactions to Deregulation, IN-
TERAVIA, May 1979, at 427, 427-28.
82 Id. at 428; see also D. REGAS, supra note 16, at 56-57.
81 See Special Air Transport Conference, Montreal, April 13-26, 1977, ICAO Doc.
9199 SATC (1977). The last time ICAO dealt with regulatory issues in air trans-
port pursuant to a resolution of the first ICAO Interim Assembly was in Geneva in
1947.
ICAO previously had abandoned attempts to seek a multi-
lateral regime covering economic regulatory matters, and
had received no new mandate on that score since the first
Interim Assembly of 1946, many were skeptical that the
first Transport Conference would do no more than bring
the issues into the open. The agenda was divided into
four headings: (1) analysis of the open rate situation and
the widespread violations of IATA-approved fares; (2) es-
tablishment of policies regarding charter airlines; (3) reg-
ulation of capacity in international air transport; and (4)
the creation of an international mechanism for setting
rates and fares.
The debate at this first Conference showed that the
ninety-seven governments represented had different per-
ceptions of both the problems and potential solutions.
On the question of charter services, which were occurring
on a regular basis in many instances, some delegates fa-
vored an integrated international regime that would cover
the control and surveillance of certain categories of non-
scheduled services. Others felt that these operations
should be regulated separately. With respect to excess ca-
pacity, some delegates suggested that the situation over
North Atlantic routes was a short-term phenomenon due
to the introduction of jumbo jets combined with world-
wide recession. The majority, however, felt that excess ca-
pacity was a long term problem due to deficiencies in the
regulatory system.8 4
The far-ranging debate showed a wide disparity of
views, which precluded any kind of consensus. As the ma-
jor player advocating free market policies amidst the dis-
parate views, the United States became very isolated. If
there was any kind of agreement reached, it was that no
matter how serious the shortcomings in the system, solu-
tions must be found in bilateral agreements and should
not be left to the vagaries of the market.
By the time the Second Air Transport Conference was
" See First International Air Transport Meeting in Three Decades Sought Multilateral
Solutions for Critical Areas, ICAO BULL., July 1977.
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held in 1980,s5 the solid opposition to deregulation poli-
cies was crumbling as the United States had already
signed bilateral agreements with some fifteen countries.
All these bilateral treaties were negotiated on a one-by-
one basis preventing airlines in a particular region, for ex-
ample Europe, from grouping together and putting up a
common front.86 The United States negotiating strategy,
which Jonsson described as "a carrot-and stick approach"
satisfied American demands for competitive pricing, liber-
alized capacity and charter provisions and offered new
route access to valuable United States markets sought by
foreign carriers. The stick was represented by threats of
traffic diversion since American carriers could easily sub-
stitute one European gateway for another to force recalci-
trant adversaries to come to terms. In these
circumstances, the opposition voiced at ICAO Assembly
sessions and air transport conferences to the American
position had little practical effect.88
By the time the Third Air Transport Conference was
convened in 1985, regulatory reform as such was no
1- See Second Air Transport Conference, Montreal, Feb. 12-28, 1980, ICAO Doc. 9297
AT Conf/Z (1980).
81; See Brindley, supra note 81, at 428.
97 See C. JONSSON, supra note 80, at 124.
" A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW § 5-1, at 5-111 (2d ed. 1981). Lowenfeld has
observed:
[These conferences] had begun to resemble the United Nations
General Assembly: the rule of one country, one vote meant that the
developing countries, when united, controlled the conference. Indi-
vidually, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Morocco, Venezuela, etc.
might make their arrangements in bilateral accords with the United
States and other developed countries; as a group in a large confer-
ence, however, the developing countries tended to join in the posi-
tion that free competition meant ganging up of the strong against
the weak, and threatened the opportunity of each country (or group
of small countries) to field an international airline.
Id.
Thus, at the first two air transport conferences, as Lowenfeld further observed,
the majority favored capacity controls, restrictions on charters, and
strict control of fares by IATA. The fact that all of these positions
put the majority at odds with the United States, was not a discour-
agement to bloc voting, nor, in the context of the ICAO confer-
ences, an invitation to negotiate.
longer an issue as more and more states had joined the
deregulatory bandwagon, albeit more out of necessity
than conviction. 9 The Conference considered a host of
unilateral measures perceived as detrimental to the inter-
national system. The most urgent items considered were
measures dealing with competition laws, airline marketing
and selling, airline currency transfers and the application
of noise constraints on older jet aircraft. As the result of a
Show Cause Order, which would have lifted antitrust im-
munity for all IATA-approved tariffs, several airlines were
concerned about the effect United States antitrust laws
might have on the way they could conduct business. 90
The Third Air Transport Conference adopted several
sweeping recommendations that urged states to avoid
unilateral application of their domestic competition legis-
lation by engaging in bilateral negotiations with other af-
fected states.9 ' The Conference asked the ICAO Council
to develop guidelines and recommendations to assist
states to avoid conflicts over application of domestic legis-
lation.92 Even though the major culprit was never named
as such, the United States delegate took strong exception
to suggestions that ICAO could have a say in the way
states apply their basic economic policies. In his view,
ICAO's recommendations to states would take the Organ-
ization beyond its appropriate role by questioning na-
- See Third Air Transport Conference, Montreal, Oct. 22-Nov. 7, 1985, ICAO Doc.
9470 AT Conf/3 (1985) [hereinafter ICAO Third Air Transport Conference].
- See Unilateral Measures Which Affect Air Transport, ICAO Doc. AT-Conf/3 WP/3
(1985) (paper presented by the Secretary General); see also C. JONSSON, supra note
80, at ch. 7. Due to the airlines concern over the application of antitrust laws,
IATA tariff conferences were paralyzed and some of them had to be cancelled at
the last minute. After a lengthy review, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
issued an order saying it would accept procedural changes made by IATA as satis-
factory to maintain antitrust immunity and clarifying under what conditions the
DOT would retroactively rescind such immunity in cases of specific violations of
an IATA agreement. DOT Order 88-6-9.
m See ICAO Doc. AT-Conf/3-WP/71, at 3, 3-11 (1985); see also Dempsey, The
Role of the International Civil Aviation Organization on Deregulation, Discrimination and
Dispute Resolution, 52 J. AIR LAW & CoM. 529, 540 (1987).
112 See Dempsey, supra note 91.
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tional policies with respect to competition laws.93
A matter of grave concern raised at this 1985 Confer-
ence was the abusive use by the major airlines of comput-
erized reservation systems (CRS) as a way to control the
market at the international level. 4 As a result, the ICAO
Council was given a mandate to study the problem and to
develop recommendations aimed at preventing display
bias, which can influence a travel agent to choose one air-
line over another. 95 The ICAO study contained few sur-
prises. For Chris Lyle there looms the important question
of determining "the type of vehicle which might be used
to package and implement the emerging conclusions
.... ,,96 Lyle recognized that ICAO in itself does not have
authority to regulate air transport: "The Organization's
conclusions in the field of air transport policy have gener-
ally been issued as recommendations to its Member
States, carrying no binding force but functioning as a
more or less effective medium for moral persuasion. ' 9 7
This anomalous situation does not prevent other inter-
national bodies from dealing with the issue. It was at this
Third Air Transport Conference that a potential conflict
was raised between ICAO and negotiators in GAIT who
were in the midst of assessing whether GATT's liberal
principles and rules should extend to air transport and re-
lated trade in services such as computerized reservation
systems. The 26th session of the ICAO Assembly in 1986
reacted with dismay at such prospects and urgently ad-
w' See id. at 540-41 (discussing in detail the position of the United States and the
United Kingdom's response); see also ICAO Third Air Transport Conference, supra note
89.
94 See Developments on Trade in Services, ICAO Doc. AT-WP/1543 (June 1988); see
also P. EHLERS, COMPUTERIZED RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS IN THE AIR TRANSPORT IN-
DUSTRY (1988) (in depth analysis of the differing worldwide CRS systems, how
they function and international policy options regarding their use).
ICAO Third Air Transport Conference, supra note 89, at 37-38.
Lyle, Computer-Age Vulnerability in the International Airline Industry, 54 J. AIR LAW
& COM. 161, 177 (1988) (Lyle is the Chief of Air Carrier Tariffs for ICAO); see also
ICAO Doc. A27-WP/50 EC/I I; Guidance Material on the Regulation of Computer Res-
ervation Systems, ICAO CIRCULAR 214-AT/84; Zubkov, The Development of Computer
Reservation Systems: The ICAO Viewpoint, ITA MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 3.
" Lyle, supra note 96, at 177-78.
vised its Member States to make sure that their negotia-
tors in GATT were fully aware of potential conflicts with
the existing legal system for the regulation of interna-
tional air transport.98
By the time the ICAO Assembly met again in 1989, a
Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS) had held sev-
eral meetings under the auspices of GATT. The feeling
at the Assembly's Economic Commission in the face of the
uncertain outcome in GAIT was reflected by the Tunisian
delegate in three words, "incomprehension and
powerlessness." The delegates realized that the problem
was not one ofjurisdiction between GATT and ICAO, but
rather, stemmed from the differing approaches to the na-
ture of air transport on the part of trade and aviation pol-
icy makers. The ICAO delegates were also pointedly
reminded by the GATT observer that any remonstrations
by ICAO should not be addressed to GATT but to their
own sovereign governments participating in the trade in
services talks. 99 Although the ICAO delegates pressed for
pertinent studies and an eventual fourth Air Transport
Conference to clarify ICAO's role in dealing with the is-
sues raised in GATT, they realized that given the GATT
calendar, any input by ICAO would come too late to influ-
ence the outcome since full negotiations on trade in serv-
ices were scheduled to get under way in 1990.
The upshot of the issues left unresolved at the Chicago
Conference is that ICAO cannot deal with economic regu-
latory matters without an unambiguous mandate to do so.
As a high ICAO official put it: "[ICAO's role in air trans-
port] is more nearly that of an international forum for the
periodic, refined and gentlemanly consideration of civil
aviation's economic problems, the outcome of which, it is
assumed, will be a more orderly and globally consistent
means of coping with these problems." 00 Lowenfeld's as-
See ICAO Doc. AT-WP/1543.
See ICAO Doc. A27-Min./EC/3 (Sept. 28, 1989) (summary of the debate).
Freer, supra note 20, at 35. Duane Freer was the Director of the ICAO Air
Navigation Bureau at the time of the article. Id.
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sessment of ICAO's role is more blunt. In his words,
"ICAO [is] ill-adapted to the task of economic regulation,
and unlikely to play a major part in developing new rules
of the game . 101
CONCLUSION
Looking to the immediate future, air transport will re-
quire new forms of international cooperation in technical
and economic areas. Whether ICAO's contracting states
will respond to the challenge depends on their willingness
to sacrifice some of their sacred sovereign rights. The ex-
pansion of air transport on a global scale with ever in-
creasing traffic densities has brought about problems that
must be solved through new multilateral mechanisms. As
a first step, states must decide on the management of a
global navigation system that meets the needs of the
whole aviation community without restrictions. In the
longer term, states will be facing responsibilities of much
greater political significance involving the allocation of
sovereign rights in the control and management of the
airspace.
This will be a daunting challenge since international
agencies are not geared to assume activities that impinge
on national sovereignty. Air transport by its very nature
should have been a counterforce to nationalism. Yet, the
regulatory system in civil aviation is still as firmly rooted
in the principle of national sovereignty as when it was first
proclaimed at the Paris Convention of 1919 and reaf-
firmed in the Chicago Convention. 0 2 Sovereignty over
,0, A. LOWENFELD, supra note 88, at 5-112.
'0 See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the recognition of
state sovereignty in the Chicago Convention. The Convention Relating to the
Regulation of Aerial Naviation, as the Paris Convention was formally labeled, was
the first attempt to regulate public international law. Paris Convention, Oct. 13,
1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173. Article I of the Paris Convention states: "The High Con-
tracting Parties recognize that every Power has complete and exclusive sover-
eignty over the air space above its territory." Id. at art. 1. The Paris Convention
remained in force until it was replaced by the Chicago Convention. Although the
United States was a party to the Paris Convention, the Senate never formally rati-
[55
the airspace has remained the cornerstone of relations be-
tween states in all respects of air transport.
The importance of sovereignty over airspace embodied
in article 1 of the Chicago Convention also is responsible
for restricting the authority of ICAO as an intergovern-
mental regulatory agency. The Organization, for all its
extensive efforts, has only limited authority. ICAO sets
standards but cannot enforce them; it devises solutions
but cannot impose them. To implement its rules ICAO
most rely not so much on legal requirements as on the
goodwill of states. Because states treat the field of eco-
nomics as their sole prerogative, ICAO has never been al-
lowed to exercise any kind of authority over economic
matters.
While ICAO does not have a specific mandate to regu-
late the economic aspects of air transport, nothing in the
Chicago Convention prevents it from assuming such a re-
sponsibility. ICAO's mandate, according to article 44, is
to "[i]nsure the safe and orderly growth of international
civil aviation throughout the world ... meet the needs of
the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and
economical air transport . . .[and to] prevent economic
waste caused by unreasonable competition."'' 0 ' Based on
a broad interpretation of these objectives, ICAO cannot
fulfill its mission without addressing the economic and
regulatory issues that stand in the way of the efficient and
economic use of air transport.
It has been forty-five years since the international com-
munity set the foundations of the international system in
civil aviation action. Profound political, economic and
technological changes have taken place in air transport.
Throughout that time, the development of international
aviation has been sustained by the strong commitment of
states to building a global network of routes and facilities.
The Chicago Convention is living proof that states can
fled it. See Cooper, United States Participation in Drafting Paris Convention 1919, 18J.
AIR L. & CoM. 226 (1951). See generally M. WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 346.
-3 Chicago Convention, supra note 3, at art. 44.
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work together to make air transport a safe mode of travel.
States must now show the same determination in solving
the more contentious issues so that an airline, which long
served the exclusive interests of a state, can become "the
chosen instrument" of their common international
interests.
Comments

